On first-order expressibility of satisfiability in submodels
Denis I. Saveliev

TL;DR
This paper investigates when the property that a model has a submodel satisfying a certain sentence can be expressed in first-order logic or its extensions, providing characterizations for specific cases involving large cardinals.
Contribution
It offers syntactical and semantical characterizations of conditions under which submodel satisfaction can be expressed in $ ext{L}_{ ext{kappa,kappa}}$, especially for $ ext{kappa}= ext{omega}$ or large cardinals.
Findings
Characterizations of when $ heta( extphi)$ is in $ ext{L}_{ ext{kappa,kappa}}$
Results for $ ext{kappa}= ext{omega}$ and certain large cardinals
Conditions under which submodel satisfaction is first-order expressible
Abstract
Let be regular cardinals, , let be a sentence of the language in a given signature, and let express the fact that holds in a submodel, i.e., any model in the signature satisfies if and only if some submodel of satisfies . It was shown in [1] that, whenever is in in the signature having less than functional symbols (and arbitrarily many predicate symbols), then is equivalent to a monadic existential sentence in the second-order language , and that for any signature having at least one binary predicate symbol there exists in such that is not equivalent to…
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On first-order expressibility
of satisfiability in submodels
Denis I. Saveliev 111 Russian Academy of Sciences, Steklov Mathematical Institute and Institute for Information Transmission Problems. The work was partially supported by grant 16-11-10252 of the Russian Science Foundation.
(2016, revised June 2019)
Abstract
Let be regular cardinals, , let be a sentence of the language in a given signature, and let express the fact that holds in a submodel, i.e., any model in the signature satisfies if and only if some submodel of satisfies . It was shown in [1] that, whenever is in in the signature having less than functional symbols (and arbitrarily many predicate symbols), then is equivalent to a monadic existential sentence in the second-order language , and that for any signature having at least one binary predicate symbol there exists in such that is not equivalent to any (first-order) sentence in . Nevertheless, in certain cases are first-order expressible. In this note, we provide several (syntactical and semantical) characterizations of the case when is in and is or a certain large cardinal.
Given a model-theoretic language (in sense of [2]) and a sentence in , let express the fact that is satisfied in a submodel. Thus for any model ,
[TABLE]
We study when , considered a priori as a meta-expression, is equivalent to a sentence in another (perhaps, the same) given model-theoretic language . Such questions naturally arise in studies of modal logics of submodels; if is closed under , then induces a modal operator on sentences (where a possibility of means the satisfiability of in a submodel), and the resulting modal logic can be regarded as a fragment of with the submodel relation on a given class of models. These logics are an instance of modal logics of various model-theoretic relations, which were introduced and studied in [1]; another instance is modal logic of forcing (see, e.g., [3]). As another source of motivation for studies undertaken in this note, let us point out the paper [4] discussing reduction of higher-order logics to second-order one.
Here we concentrate on first-order languages . Recall that is the usual first-order finitary language; expands it by involving Boolean connectives of any arities and quantifiers over first-order variables, where are given regular cardinals; and is the union of for all ; see [2], [5], [6]. It was shown in [1] that, even for in , it is possible that is not in ; on the other hand, is equivalent to a second-order (in general, infinitary) sentence; these results are reproduced as Theorems 4 and 5 below. Nevertheless, in certain cases are first-order expressible. In this note, we provide several (syntactical as well as semantical) characterizations of the case when is equivalent to a sentence in and is either or a certain large (e.g., compact) cardinal.
We start with some obvious observations, which confirm, in particular, that behaves like an S4 possibility operator.
Proposition 1**.**
For any sentences , , and , , in a model-theoretic language involving the syntactic operations under consideration, we have:
- (i)
* is equivalent to , and is equivalent to ;*
- (ii)
* implies ;*
- (iii)
* is equivalent to ;*
- (iv)
* implies ;*
- (v)
* implies , and is equivalent to ;*
- (vi)
* implies , and implies ;*
- (vii)
* implies .*
Proof.
Items (i)–(v) are immediate; (vi) follows from (ii); and (vii) from (iv) and (vi). ∎
Corollary 2**.**
For every sentence , the sentence is preserved under extensions of models. A fortiori, it is preserved under elementary extensions, unions of increasing chains of models; in purely predicate signatures: under direct unions, direct products and powers; etc.
Proof.
This follows from item (iii) of Proposition 1. ∎
Given cardinals with , recall that is -compact iff the language satisfies the -compactness, i.e., any theory in of cardinality has a model whenever each its subtheory of cardinality has a model. A cardinal is weakly compact iff it is -compact, and strongly compact iff it is -compact for all (e.g., is strongly compact). By a compact cardinal we shall mean strongly compact , and by an inaccessible, a strongly inaccessible, i.e., a regular such that for all . For more on these and other large cardinals and their connections with infinitary languages, we refer the reader to [5], [6].
Corollary 3**.**
Let be or, more generally, a compact cardinal, and a sentence in . The following are equivalent:
- (i)
* is equivalent to a sentence in ;*
- (ii)
* is equivalent to a sentence in , i.e., an existential sentence in .*
Proof.
(i)(ii). By Corollary 2 since sentences in that are preserved under extensions are exactly existential ones (for see [7]; for compact , modify the same argument). ∎
Two following results on expressibility of were essentially obtained in [1]. They show that the expressibility generally does not hold in first-order languages but is achieved in appropriate second-order ones.
Theorem 4**.**
For any signature having a predicate symbol of arity at least , there exists a sentence in such that is not equivalent to any sentence in .
Proof.
Suppose w.l.g. that is a binary predicate symbol (otherwise imitate it by using a predicate symbol of a bigger arity with fixed other arguments). Let be an obvious -sentence saying that there exists no -minimal element. Then says that each submodel has a -minimal element. Note that, if has no functional symbols, says that is well-founded. As well-known, the latter property is not expressible in (moreover, it is not RPC in ; see, e.g., [2], Chapter 9, Theorem 3.2.20), which proves the theorem for such . In the general case, we argue as follows.
Toward a contradiction, assume that there is such that is equivalent to some . It follows from Karp’s theorem (see, e.g., [8], Theorem 14.29) that there are models and of the subsignature such that is isomorphic to an ordinal while is not, and Expand and respectively to models and of by interpreting each predicate symbol other than by the empty set, each functional symbol of positive arity by the projection onto the first argument, and each constant symbol by the -last element of the model (which w.l.g. can be assumed to exist). It is easy to see that in both and any formula of is equivalent to a formula of ; so we still have On the other hand, in both models every subset forms a submodel whenever it contains the -last element of the whole model, whence it easily follows that and . A contradiction. ∎
Given a model-theoretic language , let denote the th-order extension of . A formula of is monadic iff it involves only unary predicate variables, and existential second-order, respectively, universal second-order iff it involves only existential, respectively, universal quantifiers over second-order variables preceding a first-order formula (with arbitrary quantifiers). The monadic fragment of consists of its monadic formulas; similarly for the existential and universal fragments of the language, which will be denoted by and , respectively.
Theorem 5**.**
Let be a regular cardinal and a (first-order) sentence of in a signature with functional (including constant) symbols and arbitrarily many predicate symbols. Then is equivalent to a monadic existential formula in . Moreover, the following languages are closed under :
- (i)
the monadic fragment of for any ;
- (ii)
the existential fragment of for any ;
- (iii)
* for any and .*
Proof.
If is a second-order unary predicate variable, for each functional symbol in let be an -formula stating that is closed under , and let be the -formula
[TABLE]
stating that forms a submodel. Then is equivalent to the sentence
[TABLE]
where is the relativization of to . ∎
As usual, a filter is -complete iff for all , where denotes the set of all subsets of which have cardinality .
Corollary 6**.**
Let be or, more generally, a compact cardinal, and a sentence in in a signature with functional (including constant) symbols. Then is preserved under ultraproducts by -complete ultrafilters. Moreover, this remains true for sentences in .
Proof.
By Theorem 5, for such a the statement is equivalent to a -sentence, therefore, it is preserved under ultraproducts (for see, e.g., [7], Corollary 4.1.14; for compact modify the same argument). ∎
The next result on non-expressibility of shows that the restriction on the number of functional symbols in Theorem 5 is optimal.
Theorem 7**.**
For any signature having functional (e.g., constant) symbols, there exists a sentence of (in fact, in the empty signature) such that is not equivalent to any sentence in for all , and moreover, in every language whose formulas have cardinality .
Proof.
Clearly, it suffices to consider only a signature consisting of constant symbols, say, , . Let be the sentence ; then states the existence of a single-point submodel. Toward a contradiction, assume that such an has some equivalent to . Let two models and in have the same two-point universe , and let for all ,
[TABLE]
Since , there exists such that . So we have: iff (as and satisfy the same formulas involving only symbols from ), however, and (as the singleton forms a submodel of while has no single-point submodels). ∎
Let denote that is satisfied in a submodel generated by a set of cardinality . Obviously, implies . We are going to show that is an existential sentence in an appropriate first-order language. To simplify some formulations, we shall consider partial models in which their operations can be only partial. An atomic diagram of a partial model is defined in the same way as for usual models with total operations, i.e., it consists of all true in atomic and negated atomic sentences of the language expanded by constant symbols for all elements of .
Lemma 8**.**
Let be or, more generally, an inaccessible cardinal, , and a sentence in in a signature with functional (including constant) symbols. Then is equivalent to an existential sentence in .
Proof.
Let us first consider signatures without functional symbols. Then is clearly equivalent to the first-order sentence
[TABLE]
where is the relativization of to the set of (first-order) variables , , which do not occur in . Let us verify that the relativization is equivalent to an open formula in (with parameters , ); it will clearly follow that \mbox{\Large\exists}_{\alpha<\lambda}\,x_{\alpha}\>\varphi^{\,\{x_{\alpha}:\,\alpha<\lambda\}} is equivalent to a -sentence.
Indeed, is obtained from by successively replacing each subformula \mbox{\Large\exists}_{\beta<\gamma}\,y_{\beta}\>\psi with the -formula
[TABLE]
The latter formula is equivalent to the formula
[TABLE]
which is still in since due to the condition that is inaccessible, and furthermore, to the open formula
[TABLE]
where is obtained from by substituting each variable with the variable . This eliminates all quantifiers in all subformulas of , as required.
In the general case, the construction is slightly more complex. Let expand by new constant symbols , . We still have . Hence, since is inaccessible, there exist only pairwise non-isomorphic partial models in satisfying with the universe constisting of an interpretion of all closed terms; say, , , for some . Note that, though such partial models may have size (they interpret not only the but all terms constructed from them), all they have size for some fixed with . For any , let be the atomic diagram of , and its conjunction , which is still in as . Let , , be variables not occurring in , and let be the formula obtained from by replacing each constant symbol with the variable . Then is an open formula in , and the -sentence
[TABLE]
characterizes the partial model up to isomorphism. It follows that is equivalent to the -sentence
[TABLE]
This completes the proof. ∎
Remark 1*.*
The argument shows that, whenever is an inaccessible cardinal , then moreover, is equivalent to an existential sentence in . Also we can see that Lemma 8 remains true for signatures with -ary symbols. For with functional symbols, even is non-expressible in any language with formulas of size , by the proof of Theorem 7.
A fragment of a model is an its partial submodel, i.e., a subset of the universe of together with the inherited structure. Thus for models in signatures without functional symbols, fragments are just submodels; while for models in signatures with functional symbols, operations on fragments can be partial. A fragment can be considered as a submodel of the corresponding model in the purely predicate language obtained from the original language by replacing each functional symbol of arity with a predicate symbol having the same interpretation. Clearly, for any fragment there exists the smallest submodel including it, the submodel generated by the fragment.
Let be a model and an ideal over (the universe of ) with . We shall say that the system of models (in the same signature) is coherent in iff for every , the set is included into (the universe of ) and the fragments of and of given by coincide.
As usual, an upper cone of a partially ordered set is an which is upward closed, i.e., such that whenever for some . Clearly, the set of upper cones of generates a filter over whenever is directed.
Lemma 9**.**
Let be coherent in and a filter over extending the filter generated by upper cones of . Then isomorphically embeds into , the product of the models reduced by .
Proof.
For each we fix some , and for each , let be the function defined by letting for all ,
[TABLE]
Now define by letting for all ,
[TABLE]
and check that is an isomorphic embedding of into .
Let be an -ary predicate symbol in our signature. We must check that for all in ,
[TABLE]
Since , for any there is with , and since is an ideal, . Moreover, since for all , whenever then and , and so, since the fragments of and given by coincide, is equivalent to . Thus we have:
[TABLE]
where one implication in the second equivalence holds since extends the filter generated by upper cones of while the converse implication holds since the property inherits upward. Finally, the latter assertion is equivalent to by definition of reduced products, and thus to , as required.
Let now be an -ary functional symbol in the signature. We must check that for all in ,
[TABLE]
Indeed,
[TABLE]
while
[TABLE]
Again, if for , is such that , and also is such that , whenever then and also It follows as required.
The proof is complete. ∎
Remark 2*.*
In general, even if is an ultrafilter and all the are submodels of , the embedding is not elementary, and moreover, and are not elementarily equivalent, even in the sense of . E.g., let and for all finite . Then if is , we have: , but for all , , and hence, .
Remark 3*.*
If the ideal is -complete, i.e., for all , then Lemma 9 remains true even for signatures involving -ary symbols. Let us point out also that whenever is -complete then so is the filter over generated by upper cones in (but of course not any filter extending ), and that in the case , is the least -complete fine filter over .
The theorem below is the main result of this note; it extends Corollary 3 by providing new characterizations – syntactical in item (iii) and semantical in items (iv) and (v) – of the case when is equivalent to a first-order formula.
Theorem 10**.**
Let be or, more generally, a compact cardinal and a sentence in the language in a signature with functional (including constant) symbols. The following are equivalent:
- (i)
* is equivalent to a -sentence;*
- (ii)
* is equivalent to an -sentence;*
- (iii)
* is equivalent to a -sentence;*
- (iv)
any model satisfying has a fragment of cardinality such that each model having the fragment satisfies ;
- (v)
there exists such that any model satisfying has a fragment of cardinality and such that each model having the fragment satisfies .
Proof.
(i)(ii) and (ii)(iii). Trivial.
(iii)(iv). Assume that (iv) does not hold. Then there is such that , and for every set of size , there exists a model such that , the fragments of and of given by coincide, and has no submodels satisfying , thus . Let where is a -complete ultrafilter over which is fine, i.e., extends the filter generated by the sets for all (recall that the existence of such an ultrafilter follows from the compactness of ; see, e.g., [6], Corollary 22.18). By Lemma 9, isomorphically embeds into ; therefore, . Let us show that (iii) fails.
Indeed, if is equivalent to a -formula, then is equivalent to a -formula, and hence, is preserved under ultraproducts by -complete ultrafilters (as was pointed out in the proof of Corollary 6), whence we get also ; a contradiction.
(iv)(v). Assume that (v) does not hold. Let us again use an ultraproduct argument: for any pick a model which satisfies and does not have fragments of size generating submodels satisfying , pick any -complete ultrafilter over , and consider . Clearly, satisfies . Let us show that does not have fragments of size generating submodels satisfying , thus proving that (iv) fails.
Indeed, if there is such that has some -generated submodel satisfying , i.e., , then this fact is expressed by a first-order (and even existential) sentence by Lemma 8, and hence, should hold in for -almost all , which is, however, not true.
(v)(i). Assume (v). Then is equivalent to , which is equivalent to a -sentence by Lemma 8, thus proving (i).
The theorem is proved. ∎
Corollary 11**.**
Let be or, more generally, a compact cardinal and a sentence in in a signature without functional symbols. The following are equivalent:
- (i)
* is equivalent to a sentence in (or , or );*
- (ii)
any model satisfying has a submodel of cardinality satisfying (or );
- (iii)
there exists such that any model satisfying has a submodel of cardinality satisfying (or ).
Proof.
As in such signatures the notions of fragments and submodels coincide, this follows from Theorem 10. ∎
Example 4*.*
Recall that models in signatures having only unary functional symbols are called unoids, and if such a symbol is unique, unars.
Let a signature consist of a single unary functional symbol . Let be the -sentence in . Then is equivalent to itself. Clearly, the cardinality of a finite fragment determining satisfiability of in submodels extending it, stated in Theorem 10 (v), is ; note that there are models of without finite submodels at all (e.g., so is the free -generated unar where is the successor operation).
More generally, let consist of unary functional symbols , , and let be the -sentence in . Then again, is equivalent to , is , and there are models of without submodels of size (e.g., any free -unoid).
Example 5*.*
Let a signature consist of a single binary predicate symbol .
Let be the -sentence in . Then is equivalent to , and from Corollary 11 (iii) is . Observe that is in . Indeed, assume that is in . Recall that -formulas are characterized as those that are preserved under chain unions (see [7], Theorem 3.2.2). Let be , and let be the union of the chain of the , . Then for all but ; a contradiction.
Let also be the -sentence in . Then is not equivalent to any -sentence. Indeed, the model satisfies but includes no finite submodels satisfying ; apply Corollary 11 (iii). Similar arguments show that is in and that is while is not equivalent to any -sentence.
Remark 6*.*
Although any with the first-order expressible determines the least size of a small fragment from Theorem 10, which is thus independent of a particular model, it does not determine, even up to isomorphism, the fragment itself. E.g., if is any true formula then is equivalent to ; hence in a purely predicate signature the discussed size is but there can be many non-isomorphic single-point models – arbitrarily many in an appropriate .
Remark 7*.*
Despite the low complexity of the first-order expressible , the complexity of itself can be much higher: there exist non-first-order expressible with first-order expressible . Let state the finiteness, i.e., let any model satisfy iff it is finite. As well-known, is not -expressible (though is expressible in or else in the weak second-order language; see, e.g., [2]). However, in any signature without functional symbols, is equivalent to any true formula. This example is generalized to the languages with arbitrarily large .
Remark 8*.*
Theorem 10 (and Corollary 11) remains true even for signatures with -ary symbols; for Lemmas 8 and 9 this has been already noticed, other arguments in the proof do not require any modifying.
Remark 9*.*
The results of this note admit further improvements and generalizations.
First, in Theorem 10 (and Corollary 11) it suffices to assume that is inaccessible. Moreover, for , if a sentence in holds in a model then it holds in its submodel of size (see, e.g., [2], Corollary 3.1.3), hence is equivalent to for some ; then items (i)–(v) of Theorem 10 follow due to Lemma 8 (even in a nicer form with submodels instead of fragments, like as in Corollary 11).
Further, the obtained results can be relativized to theories in a given language. Another natural generalization concerns the question when is equivalent to some theory in the same language.
Question 10*.*
Characterize first-order sentences for which are first-order sentences in .
Acknowledgement**.**
I am grateful to N. L. Poliakov for discussions on the subject of this note and especially for his valuable help in handling the case of functional signatures in Lemma 8. I am indebted to F. N. Pakhomov for his remark about the number of functional symbols in that lemma, which leaded me to Theorem 7, and for his proposal to weaken the large cardinal property of to inaccessibility by using the downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem for . I also express my appreciation to I. B. Shapirovsky who read this note and made several useful comments.
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