Unconditional security in Quantum Cryptography

TL;DR

This paper discusses methods to prove the unconditional security of quantum cryptography, specifically applying these techniques to a practical, noisy quantum key distribution protocol without restrictions on the detector used.

Contribution

It provides a security proof for a practical quantum key distribution protocol considering noise and photon loss, expanding the understanding of unconditional security in real-world quantum cryptography.

Findings

Security proof applicable to noisy channels

No restrictions on detector basis independence

Validation of protocol's unconditional security

Abstract

Basic techniques to prove the unconditional security of quantum cryptography are described. They are applied to a quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984. The proof considers a practical variation on the protocol in which the channel is noisy and photons may be lost during the transmission. The initial coding into the channel must be perfect (i.e., exactly as described in the protocol). No restriction is imposed on the detector used at the receiving side of the channel, except that whether or not the received system is detected must be independent of the basis used to measure this system.