Robustness of two-way quantum communication protocols against Trojan horse attack
Fu-Guo Deng, Ping Zhou, Xi-Han Li, Chun-Yan Li, and Hong-Yu Zhou

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the security of two-way quantum communication protocols against Trojan horse attacks, introduces a new delay-photon Trojan horse attack, and proposes practical countermeasures to enhance security.
Contribution
It presents a novel attack method and a practical defense strategy, demonstrating the robustness of two-way quantum communication protocols in real-world scenarios.
Findings
Introduction of delay-photon Trojan horse attack
Proposed practical prevention method
Confirmed robustness of protocols against new attack
Abstract
We discuss the robustness of two-way quantum communication protocols against Trojan horse attack and introduce a novel attack, delay-photon Trojan horse attack. Moreover, we present a practical way for two-way quantum communication protocols to prevent the eavesdropper from stealing the information transmitted with Trojan horse attacks. It means that two-way quantum communication protocols is also secure in a practical application.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsPhysical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security · graph theory and CDMA systems · Biometric Identification and Security
