Jeffreys priors versus experienced physicist priors - arguments against objective Bayesian theory

TL;DR

The paper critiques the use of Jeffreys reference priors in physics, arguing that experienced physicists prefer subjective priors and warning against Bayesian dogmatism that could undermine Bayesian methods.

Contribution

It challenges the suitability of Jeffreys priors for physical measurements and advocates for subjective priors based on expert judgment.

Findings

Jeffreys priors often do not fit physical measurement problems.

Experienced physicists find subjective priors more acceptable.

Warning against Bayesian dogmatism harming Bayesian inference.

Abstract

I review the problem of the choice of the priors from the point of view of a physicist interested in measuring a physical quantity, and I try to show that the reference priors often recommended for the purpose (Jeffreys priors) do not fit to the problem. Although it may seem surprising, it is easier for an ``experienced physicist'' to accept subjective priors, or even purely subjective elicitation of probabilities, without explicit use of the Bayes' theorem. The problem of the use of reference priors is set in the more general context of ``Bayesian dogmatism'', which could really harm Bayesianism.