Against Many-Worlds Interpretations

TL;DR

This paper critically reviews many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics, arguing that no consistent set of axioms supports MWI as an accurate description of known physics.

Contribution

It provides a detailed critique of MWI, analyzing their postulates and showing the lack of a plausible axiomatic foundation compatible with physical reality.

Findings

Arguments against MWI proposed by Everett, Graham, and DeWitt.

Frequency operator theorems do not support a probability interpretation.

No plausible axioms exist for an MWI consistent with known physics.

Abstract

A short foreword has been added for the archive version of this article, which otherwise appears as originally published in 1990, except for the updating of references. The original abstract follows. This is a critical review of the literature on many-worlds interpretations (MWI), with arguments drawn partly from earlier critiques by Bell and Stein. The essential postulates involved in various MWI are extracted, and their consistency with the evident physical world is examined. Arguments are presented against MWI proposed by Everett, Graham and DeWitt. The relevance of frequency operators to MWI is examined; it is argued that frequency operator theorems of Hartle and Farhi-Goldstone-Gutmann do not in themselves provide a probability interpretation for quantum mechanics, and thus neither support existing MWI nor would be useful in constructing new MWI. Comments are made on papers by Geroch and Deutsch that advocate MWI. It is concluded that no plausible set of axioms exists for an MWI that describes known physics.