The Doomsday Argument, Consciousness and Many Worlds

TL;DR

This paper links the doomsday argument to consciousness, proposing that consciousness arises from superpositions of brain states across many worlds, which challenges traditional probabilistic predictions about humanity's future.

Contribution

It introduces a novel connection between the doomsday argument and the many-worlds interpretation, suggesting consciousness implies an infinite superposition of histories that defy classical probabilistic predictions.

Findings

Consciousness cannot be generated by a single deterministic law.

An infinite conscious lifetime is fundamentally impossible.

The doomsday argument does not predict in a many-worlds framework.

Abstract

The doomsday argument is a probabilistic argument that claims to predict the total lifetime of the human race. By examining the case of an individual lifetime, I conclude that the argument is fundamentally related to consciousness. I derive a reformulation stating that an infinite conscious lifetime is not possible even in principle. By considering a hypothetical conscious computer, running a non-terminating program, I deduce that consciousness cannot be generated by a single set of deterministic laws. Instead, I hypothesize that consciousness is generated by a superposition of brain states that is simultaneously associated with many quasi-classical histories, each following a different set of deterministic laws. I generalize the doomsday argument and discover that it makes no prediction in this case. Thus I conclude that the very fact of our consciousness provides us with evidence for a many-worlds interpretation of reality in which our future is not predictable using anthropic reasoning.