Is Many Likelier than Few? A Critical Assessment of the Self-Indicating Assumption

TL;DR

This paper critically examines the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA), demonstrating that its supporting arguments are flawed or inconclusive, and argues that rejecting the Doomsday Argument requires alternative approaches.

Contribution

It provides a critical assessment of SIA, showing it lacks compelling support and highlighting the need for different solutions to the Doomsday Argument.

Findings

Arguments for SIA are flawed or inconclusive

SIA leads to implausible physical and epistemological consequences

Rejecting Doomsday Argument requires alternative hypotheses

Abstract

We analyze the arguments allegedly supporting the so-called Self-Indication Assumption (SIA), as an attempt to reject counterintuitive consequences of the Doomsday Argument of Carter, Leslie, Gott and others. Several arguments purportedly supporting this assumption are demonstrated to be either flawed or, at best, inconclusive. Therefore, no compelling reason for accepting SIA exists so far, and it should be regarded as an ad hoc hypothesis with several rather strange and implausible physical and epistemological consequences. Accordingly, if one wishes to reject the controversial consequences of the Doomsday Argument, a route different from SIA has to be found.