Uniform Provability in Classical Logic
Gopalan Nadathur

TL;DR
This paper explores uniform provability in classical logic, identifying a fragment where it holds and proposing a goal-directed proof procedure that integrates mechanisms for disjunctive assumptions and hypotheticals.
Contribution
It introduces a modified fragment of classical logic where uniform provability is valid and develops a proof procedure that incorporates existing mechanisms for disjunctive information and hypotheticals.
Findings
Uniform provability holds in a specific fragment of classical logic.
A goal-directed proof procedure is outlined based on this fragment.
The procedure integrates mechanisms for disjunctive assumptions and hypotheticals.
Abstract
Uniform proofs are sequent calculus proofs with the following characteristic: the last step in the derivation of a complex formula at any stage in the proof is always the introduction of the top-level logical symbol of that formula. We investigate the relevance of this uniform proof notion to structuring proof search in classical logic. A logical language in whose context provability is equivalent to uniform provability admits of a goal-directed proof procedure that interprets logical symbols as search directives whose meanings are given by the corresponding inference rules. While this uniform provability property does not hold directly of classical logic, we show that it holds of a fragment of it that only excludes essentially positive occurrences of universal quantifiers under a modest, sound, modification to the set of assumptions: the addition to them of the negation of the formula…
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Taxonomy
TopicsLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Logic, programming, and type systems · Semantic Web and Ontologies
