Decision-Theoretic Foundations for Causal Reasoning

TL;DR

This paper introduces a decision-theoretic approach to defining causality, linking it to influence diagrams and counterfactual reasoning, offering a new perspective on causal assertions based on available decisions.

Contribution

It provides a novel decision-theoretic foundation for causality, connecting influence diagrams with Pearl's causal models and enabling counterfactual analysis.

Findings

Causal assertions depend on available decisions.

Canonical influence diagrams relate to Pearl's causal graphs.

Counterfactual reasoning is facilitated by canonical form.

Abstract

We present a definition of cause and effect in terms of decision-theoretic primitives and thereby provide a principled foundation for causal reasoning. Our definition departs from the traditional view of causation in that causal assertions may vary with the set of decisions available. We argue that this approach provides added clarity to the notion of cause. Also in this paper, we examine the encoding of causal relationships in directed acyclic graphs. We describe a special class of influence diagrams, those in canonical form, and show its relationship to Pearl's representation of cause and effect. Finally, we show how canonical form facilitates counterfactual reasoning.