On Using Matching Theory to Understand P2P Network Design

TL;DR

This paper applies stable matching theory to analyze P2P network stability, revealing conditions for unique stable states and convergence properties based on node preferences derived from exchange policies.

Contribution

It introduces a stable matching model for P2P networks considering node heterogeneity and preference structures, providing new insights into network stability and convergence.

Findings

Most P2P exchanges can be modeled with stable matching theory.

Acyclic preference lists lead to unique stable states.

Networks with acyclic preferences have good convergence properties.

Abstract

This paper aims to provide insight into stability of collaboration choices in P2P networks. We study networks where exchanges between nodes are driven by the desire to receive the best service available. This is the case for most existing P2P networks. We explore an evolution model derived from stable roommates theory that accounts for heterogeneity between nodes. We show that most P2P applications can be modeled using stable matching theory. This is the case whenever preference lists can be deduced from the exchange policy. In many cases, the preferences lists are characterized by an interesting acyclic property. We show that P2P networks with acyclic preferences possess a unique stable state with good convergence properties.