Why is Open Access Development so Successful? Stigmergic organization and the economics of information
Francis Heylighen

TL;DR
This paper explains the success of open access development through a theoretical framework combining economics and self-organization, highlighting stigmergy as a coordination mechanism that replaces traditional market and organizational structures.
Contribution
It introduces a novel theoretical explanation for open access success, emphasizing stigmergic organization and the economic incentives for information sharing.
Findings
Open access information is not scarce and can be replicated at virtually no cost.
Contributing to open projects enhances reputation and quality, incentivizing participation.
Stigmergy enables self-organization without centralized control or market mechanisms.
Abstract
The explosive development of "free" or "open source" information goods contravenes the conventional wisdom that markets and commercial organizations are necessary to efficiently supply products. This paper proposes a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon, using concepts from economics and theories of self-organization. Once available on the Internet, information is intrinsically not a scarce good, as it can be replicated virtually without cost. Moreover, freely distributing information is profitable to its creator, since it improves the quality of the information, and enhances the creator's reputation. This provides a sufficient incentive for people to contribute to open access projects. Unlike traditional organizations, open access communities are open, distributed and self-organizing. Coordination is achieved through stigmergy: listings of "work-in-progress" direct potential…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpen Source Software Innovations · Auction Theory and Applications · Private Equity and Venture Capital
