Secure Component Deployment in the OSGi(tm) Release 4 Platform
Pierre Parrend (INRIA Rh\^one-Alpes), St\'ephane Fr\'enot (INRIA, Rh\^one-Alpes)

TL;DR
This paper discusses security mechanisms for deploying components in the OSGi Release 4 platform, focusing on cryptographic signing, validation, and a secure extension of the Felix framework to enhance deployment security.
Contribution
It introduces cryptographic signing processes for OSGi bundles, a secure Felix extension, and a signing tool, advancing security in component deployment for embedded systems.
Findings
Implementation of bundle signing and validation process
Development of SFelix platform extension
Creation of SFelix JarSigner tool
Abstract
Last years have seen a dramatic increase in the use of component platforms, not only in classical application servers, but also more and more in the domain of Embedded Systems. The OSGi(tm) platform is one of these platforms dedicated to lightweight execution environments, and one of the most prominent. However, new platforms also imply new security flaws, and a lack of both knowledge and tools for protecting the exposed systems. This technical report aims at fostering the understanding of security mechanisms in component deployment. It focuses on securing the deployment of components. It presents the cryptographic mechanisms necessary for signing OSGi(tm) bundles, as well as the detailed process of bundle signature and validation. We also present the SFelix platform, which is a secure extension to Felix OSGi(tm) framework implementation. It includes our implementation of the bundle…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity and Verification in Computing · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques · Real-Time Systems Scheduling
