New directions in mechanism design
Jiangtao Meng

TL;DR
This paper introduces the X mechanism and three new concepts—partly truthful, critical, and consistent—that extend traditional mechanism design, aiming to improve utility optimization beyond the limitations of truthful mechanisms like VCG.
Contribution
The paper proposes a novel X mechanism and three new mechanism properties, expanding the scope of mechanism design beyond truthfulness.
Findings
X mechanism outperforms VCG in utility optimization
Partly truthful, critical, and consistent are essential new directions
X mechanism generalizes Vickrey auctions in many aspects
Abstract
Mechanism design uses the tools of economics and game theory to design rules of interaction for economic transactions that will,in principle, yield some de- sired outcome. In the last few years this field has received much interest of researchers in computer science, especially with the Internet developing as a platform for communications and connections among enormous numbers of computers and humans. Arguably the most positive result in mechanism de- sign is truthful and there are only one general truthful mechanisms so far : the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. But VCG mecha- nism has one shortage: The implementation of truthfulness is on the cost of decreasing the revenue of the mechanism. (e.g., Ning Chen and Hong Zhu. [1999]). We introduce three new characters of mechanism:partly truthful, criti- cal, consistent, and introduce a new mechanism: X mechanism that…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Optimization and Search Problems
