When Ignorance is Bliss
Peter D. Grunwald, Joseph Y. Halpern

TL;DR
This paper challenges the common belief that more information always improves decision-making, demonstrating that ignoring certain information can be beneficial in specific uncertain scenarios using Bayesian and non-Bayesian analyses.
Contribution
It introduces a framework showing when ignoring information is advantageous, especially with set-based uncertainties and small sample sizes.
Findings
Ignoring information can prevent dilation of uncertainty.
Bayesian analysis shows worse predictions with noninformative priors in small samples.
Ignoring information can outperform Bayesian updating in certain tasks.
Abstract
It is commonly-accepted wisdom that more information is better, and that information should never be ignored. Here we argue, using both a Bayesian and a non-Bayesian analysis, that in some situations you are better off ignoring information if your uncertainty is represented by a set of probability measures. These include situations in which the information is relevant for the prediction task at hand. In the non-Bayesian analysis, we show how ignoring information avoids dilation, the phenomenon that additional pieces of information sometimes lead to an increase in uncertainty. In the Bayesian analysis, we show that for small sample sizes and certain prediction tasks, the Bayesian posterior based on a noninformative prior yields worse predictions than simply ignoring the given information.
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Taxonomy
TopicsDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Statistical Mechanics and Entropy
