A Secure Traitor Tracing Scheme against Key Exposure
Kazuto Ogawa, Goichiro Hanaoka, Hideki Imai

TL;DR
This paper introduces a secure traitor tracing scheme that combines traitor tracing and forward secure cryptography to enhance digital content protection and usability, while mitigating damage from key exposure.
Contribution
The paper presents a novel TTaKE scheme that integrates traitor tracing with forward security, suitable for digital broadcasting and resistant to key exposure.
Findings
Provides a scheme that prevents illegal decoders.
Minimizes damage from key exposure.
Fits current digital broadcasting systems.
Abstract
Copyright protection is a major issue in distributing digital content. On the other hand, improvements to usability are sought by content users. In this paper, we propose a secure {\it traitor tracing scheme against key exposure (TTaKE)} which contains the properties of both a traitor tracing scheme and a forward secure public key cryptosystem. Its structure fits current digital broadcasting systems and it may be useful in preventing traitors from making illegal decoders and in minimizing the damage from accidental key exposure. It can improve usability through these properties.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
