Authenticated tree parity machine key exchange

TL;DR

This paper introduces methods for authenticating Tree Parity Machine key exchanges, enhancing security against man-in-the-middle attacks without altering the system's fundamental physics.

Contribution

It proposes an authentication scheme based on hashing and integrates Zero-Knowledge protocols into TPM synchronization, preventing known attacks.

Findings

Authentication methods prevent man-in-the-middle attacks

Zero-Knowledge integration enhances security

System physics remain unaffected

Abstract

The synchronisation of Tree Parity Machines (TPMs), has proven to provide a valuable alternative concept for secure symmetric key exchange. Yet, from a cryptographer's point of view, authentication is at least as important as a secure exchange of keys. Adding an authentication via hashing e.g. is straightforward but with no relation to Neural Cryptography. We consequently formulate an authenticated key exchange within this concept. Another alternative, integrating a Zero-Knowledge protocol into the synchronisation, is also presented. A Man-In-The-Middle attack and even all currently known attacks, that are based on using identically structured TPMs and synchronisation as well, can so be averted. This in turn has practical consequences on using the trajectory in weight space. Both suggestions have the advantage of not affecting the previously observed physics of this interacting system at all.