A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems

TL;DR

This paper applies game theory to design incentive mechanisms in P2P networks, addressing resource variability and promoting cooperation among rational peers.

Contribution

It introduces a differential service-based incentive scheme to enhance resource availability and system performance in self-organizing P2P networks.

Findings

The incentive scheme encourages cooperation among peers.

Resource availability improves with the proposed mechanism.

System performance becomes more stable and predictable.

Abstract

Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.