Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part II: Explanations
Joseph Y. Halpern, Judea Pearl

TL;DR
This paper introduces a structural-model approach to defining causal explanations, focusing on facts that would constitute actual causes of an event if verified, addressing previous issues in explanation theories.
Contribution
It presents a novel formal definition of causal explanation using structural equations and counterfactuals, improving on prior models and handling complex examples effectively.
Findings
The new definition handles problematic examples from literature.
It formalizes explanations as facts that would be actual causes if true.
The approach clarifies the role of uncertainty in causal explanations.
Abstract
We propose new definitions of (causal) explanation, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. The definition is based on the notion of actual cause, as defined and motivated in a companion paper. Essentially, an explanation is a fact that is not known for certain but, if found to be true, would constitute an actual cause of the fact to be explained, regardless of the agent's initial uncertainty. We show that the definition handles well a number of problematic examples from the literature.
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Taxonomy
TopicsBayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Cognitive Science and Mapping · Advanced Text Analysis Techniques
