Indicators of Independence in Regulatory Commissions
Susan Oberlander

TL;DR
This paper explores how regulatory commissions like the FCC maintain independence in decision-making by analyzing internal rules, resources, and relationships that influence their operational practices.
Contribution
It provides a detailed analysis of the internal factors and practices that enable independence in regulatory agencies, emphasizing staff practices alongside institutional structure.
Findings
Internal rules and resources influence independence
Relationships within the environment impact decision practices
Staff practices are crucial for operational independence
Abstract
Independent regulatory commissions such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must produce policies that reflect technical expertise, legal precedent, and stakeholder input. Given these situational imperatives, how does the FCC implement independence in its decision-making? This research explicates some of the underlying rules, resources, and relationships within the environment in which the agency is embedded that influence agency work practices to operationalize independence. Research such as this may be helpful in the creation of new, or for assessment of existing, regulatory commissions, but only if great attention is paid not only to institutional structure, but also to the practice of staff in the agency.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPolitical Influence and Corporate Strategies · Regulation and Compliance Studies
