Competition and Commons: The Post-Telecom Act Public Interest, in and after the AOLTW Merger

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how the 1996 Telecommunications Act links competition policy with the social concept of the commons, using the AOL Time Warner merger as a case study to explore public interest debates.

Contribution

It proposes a novel framework connecting competition policy and the commons to interpret public interest in communications regulation.

Findings

Competition fosters interactivity and social relationships.

The linked concepts help interpret spectrum and IP policies.

Public interest debates are influenced by political conflicts.

Abstract

In asserting a competitive market environment as a justification for regulatory forbearance, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 finally articulated a clear standard for the FCC's public interest standard, one of the most protean concepts in communications. This seeming clarity has not, however, inhibited intense political conflict over the term. This paper examines public and regulatory debate over the AOL Time Warner merger as an example of the way in which the linkage between competitions and commons policy becomes relevant to communications policy, particularly in relation to mass media, and discusses interpretations of the public interest in the current FCC. The paper proposes that the Telecom Act's goal of fostering economic competition among information service providers, and the democratic ideal of nurturing public relationships and behaviors can be linked. Competition policy that creates the opportunity for untrammeled interactivity also provides a sine qua non to nurture the social phenomenon of the commons. The linked concepts of competition and commons could also provide useful ways to interpret the public interest in policy arenas as spectrum allocation and intellectual property.