Competing DNS Roots: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?

TL;DR

This paper examines the economic and policy implications of competing DNS roots, arguing that such competition is a healthy response to bottlenecks in top-level domain name supply and can enhance system robustness.

Contribution

It provides a formal definition of root competition, analyzes its structural forms, and discusses policy implications, highlighting its role as a form of standards competition.

Findings

Multiple roots are a form of standards competition influenced by network externalities.

Root competition arises from demand-supply disjunction in top-level domains.

Permitting root competition can improve system resilience and address inefficiencies.

Abstract

The Internet Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical name space that enables the assignment of unique, mnemonic identifiers to Internet hosts and the consistent mapping of these names to IP addresses. The root of the domain name system is the top of the hierarchy and is currently managed by a quasi-private centralized regulatory authority, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). This paper identifies and discusses the economic and policy issues raised by competing DNS roots. The paper provides a precise definition of root-competition and shows that multiple roots are a species of standards competition, in which network externalities play a major role. The paper performs a structural analysis of the different forms that competing DNS roots can take and their effects on end-user compatibility. It then explores the policy implications of the various forms of competition. The thesis of the paper is that root competition is caused by a severe disjunction between the demand for and supply of top-level domain names. ICANN has authorized a tiny number of new top-level domains (7) and subjected their operators to excruciatingly slow and expensive contractual negotiations. The growth of alternate DNS roots is an attempt to bypass that bottleneck. The paper arrives at the policy conclusion that competition among DNS roots should be permitted and is a healthy outlet for inefficiency or abuses of power by the dominant root administrator.