Statistical mechanics of systems with heterogeneous agents: Minority Games
D. Challet, M. Marsili, R. Zecchina

TL;DR
This paper analyzes a model of heterogeneous agents using statistical mechanics, revealing that the system's stationary state aligns with a solvable disordered spin model, distinct from the Nash equilibrium.
Contribution
It introduces an analytical approach linking a game theoretical model to a disordered spin system, highlighting differences from Nash equilibrium through replica symmetry analysis.
Findings
Stationary state matches the ground state of a disordered spin model.
Nash equilibrium exhibits replica symmetry breaking.
Numerical results confirm analytical predictions.
Abstract
We study analytically a simple game theoretical model of heterogeneous interacting agents. We show that the stationary state of the system is described by the ground state of a disordered spin model which is exactly solvable within the simple replica symmetric ansatz. Such a stationary state differs from the Nash equilibrium where each agent maximizes her own utility. The latter turns out to be characterized by a replica symmetry broken structure. Numerical results fully agree with our analytic findings.
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