Competition, efficiency and collective behavior in the "El Farol" bar model

TL;DR

This paper analyzes the El Farol bar model, exploring its phase diagram and the effects of payoff functions on resource distribution, revealing complex behaviors and regions of efficiency and inefficiency.

Contribution

It provides a detailed characterization of the phase diagram of the simplest El Farol model and examines how payoff modifications influence collective behavior.

Findings

Identified three regions: efficient, inefficient, and better than random.

The efficient region exhibits a complex, rich structure.

Alterations in payoff functions tend to promote resource waste.

Abstract

The El Farol bar model, proposed to study the dynamics of competition of agents in a variety of contexts (W. B. Arthur, Amer. Econ. Assoc. Pap. and Proc. 84, 406 (1994)) is studied. We characterize in detail the three regions of the phase diagram (efficient, inefficient and better than random) of the simplest version of the model (D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang, Physica A, 246, 407 (1997)). The efficient region is shown to have a rich structure, which is investigated in some detail. Changes in the payoff function enhance further the tendency of the model towards a wasteful distribution of resources.