Evolutionary Minority Game: The Roles of Response Time and Mutation Threshold
Shahar Hod, Ehud Nakar

TL;DR
This paper investigates how response time and mutation thresholds influence agent strategies in the evolutionary minority game, revealing their impact on overall system behavior and agent performance.
Contribution
It introduces an analysis of how response time and mutation thresholds affect strategy distributions and agent success in the evolutionary minority game.
Findings
Short response times lead to better performance in free markets.
High mutation thresholds favor more patient agents.
Strategy distributions vary with parameter settings, showing U, inverse-U, or W shapes.
Abstract
In the evolutionary minority game, agents are allowed to evolve their strategies (``mutate'') based on past experience. We explore the dependence of the system's global behavior on the response time and the mutation threshold of the agents. We find that the precise values of these parameters determine if the strategy distribution of the population has a U-shape, inverse-U-shape, or a W-shape. It is shown that in a free society (market), highly adaptive agents (with short response times) perform best. In addition, ``patient'' agents (with high mutation threshold) outperform ``nervous'' ones.
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