Cascade control and defense in complex networks
Adilson E. Motter

TL;DR
This paper introduces a costless cascade control strategy in complex networks, where selectively removing nodes or edges after an initial failure prevents widespread overload cascades.
Contribution
The study proposes a novel, costless defense mechanism involving targeted removal of network elements post-attack to mitigate cascade effects in complex networks.
Findings
Selective removal reduces cascade size significantly
Strategy is effective without additional costs
Prevents widespread network failures
Abstract
Complex networks with heterogeneous distribution of loads may undergo a global cascade of overload failures when highly loaded nodes or edges are removed due to attacks or failures. Since a small attack or failure has the potential to trigger a global cascade, a fundamental question regards the possible strategies of defense to prevent the cascade from propagating through the entire network. Here we introduce and investigate a costless strategy of defense based on a selective further removal of nodes and edges, right after the initial attack or failure. This intentional removal of network elements is shown to drastically reduce the size of the cascade.
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