Analysis of Norms Game in networked societies

TL;DR

This paper extends Axelrod's model of norm enforcement in societies, analyzing how punishment levels and proximity influence norm stability, and explores alternative mechanisms like direct bonuses for norm enforcement.

Contribution

It provides a detailed analysis and new ideas on norm formation mechanisms, including the effects of punishment and alternative enforcement strategies.

Findings

High punishment levels do not guarantee norm stability.

Proximity of norm enforcers significantly affects norm persistence.

Direct bonus mechanisms can establish norms without meta-norms.

Abstract

Norms, defined as generally accepted behaviour in societies without central authority (and thus distinguished from laws), are very powerful mechanism leading to coherent behaviour of the society members. This paper examines, within a simple numerical simulation, the various effects that may lead to norm formation and stability. The approach has been first used by Axelrod, who proposed two step model of norm and meta-norm enforcement. We present here an extension and detailed analysis of the original work, as well as several new ideas that may bear on the norm establishment mechanisms in societies. It turns out that a relatively simple model for simulated norm enforcement predicts persistent norm breaking even when it is associated with high punishment levels. The key factors appear to be the combination of the level of penalty for breaking the norm and proximity of norm enforcers. We also study a totally different mechanism of norm establishment, without meta-norms but using instead the direct bonus mechanism to norm-enforcers.