Comments on evolution of cooperation: assortative encounters with selfknowledge

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how self-knowledge of strategies influences the evolution of cooperation in assortative matching models, revealing changes in behavior and payoffs within Bergstrom's framework.

Contribution

It extends Bergstrom's model by incorporating self-knowledge, showing its impact on assortativity and strategic payoffs in cooperation evolution.

Findings

Self-knowledge alters the assortativity index.

Changes in payoffs depend on strategy and self-awareness.

Behavioral dynamics differ with self-knowledge inclusion.

Abstract

The theoretical description of the evolution of cooperation presented by Bergstrom based on assortative matching with partner choice allows to model the population dynamics in a game of Nonrepetitive Prisoners Dilemma. In this paper we present a short analysis of asymmetric effects brought into the game by self knowledge of the participants, that is the knowledge of one's own strategy. Within the same conceptual framework as introduced by Bergstrom inclusion of selfknowledge leads to different behaviour of the assortativity index and changes in payoffs for different strategies.