Emerging behavior in electronic bidding
I. Yang, H. Jeong, B. Kahng, and A.-L. Barabasi
TL;DR
This paper analyzes online auction data, revealing that a small minority of highly active agents dominate bidding activity and influence final prices, following power-law distributions.
Contribution
It provides the first statistical characterization of agent behavior and influence in online auctions, highlighting the dominance of a few active bidders.
Findings
Bid counts follow power-law distributions.
A small minority of agents influence auction prices.
Active agents account for a significant portion of bidding activity.
Abstract
We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of agents on two major online auction sites. The measurements indicate that the total number of bids placed in a single category and the number of distinct auctions frequented by a given agent follow power-law distributions, implying that a few agents are responsible for a significant fraction of the total bidding activity on the online market. We find that these agents exert an un-proportional influence on the final price of the auctioned items. This domination of online auctions by an unusually active minority may be a generic feature of all online mercantile processes.
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