Cascade-based attacks on complex networks
Adilson E. Motter, Ying-Cheng Lai

TL;DR
This paper investigates how targeted attacks on complex networks with load redistribution can trigger cascading failures, leading to large-scale collapses, especially in highly heterogeneous systems like the Internet and power grids.
Contribution
It reveals the vulnerability of load-bearing complex networks to cascades initiated by single-node attacks, highlighting the importance of network heterogeneity in failure dynamics.
Findings
Heterogeneous load distribution increases network vulnerability.
Single-node attacks can trigger large cascades.
Power grids and the Internet are particularly susceptible.
Abstract
We live in a modern world supported by large, complex networks. Examples range from financial markets to communication and transportation systems. In many realistic situations the flow of physical quantities in the network, as characterized by the loads on nodes, is important. We show that for such networks where loads can redistribute among the nodes, intentional attacks can lead to a cascade of overload failures, which can in turn cause the entire or a substantial part of the network to collapse. This is relevant for real-world networks that possess a highly heterogeneous distribution of loads, such as the Internet and power grids. We demonstrate that the heterogeneity of these networks makes them particularly vulnerable to attacks in that a large-scale cascade may be triggered by disabling a single key node. This brings obvious concerns on the security of such systems.
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