On Spatial Asymmetric Games
E. Ahmed, A. S. Hegazi, A. S. Elgazzar
TL;DR
This paper investigates the stability of various spatial asymmetric games, analyzing both linear and nonlinear stability, and introduces telegraph reaction diffusion models for these games, including parental investment scenarios with diffusion effects.
Contribution
It presents a comprehensive stability analysis of asymmetric spatial games and introduces telegraph reaction diffusion equations for modeling these systems.
Findings
Stability conditions for asymmetric hawk-dove and prisoner's dilemma games.
Development of telegraph reaction diffusion models for asymmetric games.
Analysis of parental investment games with diffusion effects.
Abstract
The stability of some spatial asymmeric games is discussed. Both linear and nonlinear asymptotic stability of asymmetric hawk-dove and prisoner's dilemma are studied. Telegraph reaction diffusion equations for the asymmetric spatial games are presented. Asymmetric game of parental investment is studied in the presence of both ordinary and cross diffusions.
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Taxonomy
TopicsMathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics