Evolutionary games and quasispecies
M. Laessig, L. Peliti, F. Tria

TL;DR
This paper explores how populations of sequences evolve under mutation and frequency-dependent selection using a mathematical model based on the hawk-dove game, revealing unique quasispecies properties.
Contribution
It introduces a nonlinear reaction-diffusion model for evolutionary dynamics with frequency-dependent fitness, highlighting differences from fixed fitness landscapes.
Findings
Stationary distribution forms a quasispecies with distinct properties
Frequency-dependent fitness alters traditional quasispecies structure
Model provides insights into genomic regulation evolution
Abstract
We discuss a population of sequences subject to mutations and frequency-dependent selection, where the fitness of a sequence depends on the composition of the entire population. This type of dynamics is crucial to understand the evolution of genomic regulation. Mathematically, it takes the form of a reaction-diffusion problem that is nonlinear in the population state. In our model system, the fitness is determined by a simple mathematical game, the hawk-dove game. The stationary population distribution is found to be a quasispecies with properties different from those which hold in fixed fitness landscapes.
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