A secure key-exchange protocol with an absence of injective functions
R. Mislovaty, Y. Perchenok, Ido Kanter, Wolfgang Kinzel

TL;DR
This paper presents a neural cryptography key-exchange protocol that enhances security by increasing synchronization time and decreasing attacker success probability without relying on traditional number theory or trapdoor functions.
Contribution
The authors introduce a neural cryptography protocol that achieves security through network synchronization properties, eliminating the need for injective functions or trapdoor mechanisms.
Findings
Synchronization time scales with L^2
Attacker success probability decreases exponentially with L
Protocol offers a secure alternative to traditional cryptography
Abstract
The security of neural cryptography is investigated. A key-exchange protocol over a public channel is studied where the parties exchanging secret messages use multilayer neural networks which are trained by their mutual output bits and synchronize to a time dependent secret key. The weights of the networks have integer values between . Recently an algorithm for an eavesdropper which could break the key was introduced by Shamir et al. [adi]. We show that the synchronization time increases with while the probability to find a successful attacker decreases exponentially with . Hence for large we find a secure key-exchange protocol which depends neither on number theory nor on injective trapdoor functions used in conventional cryptography.
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