Analyzing Social Network Structures in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal

TL;DR

This paper investigates the social network structures emerging in an extended Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma allowing players to choose and refuse partners, revealing complex adaptive behaviors and metastable populations.

Contribution

It introduces a novel analysis of social networks within the IPD/CR environment, highlighting the emergence of metastable mixed-strategy populations.

Findings

Identification of social network patterns in IPD/CR populations

Discovery of metastable populations of mixed strategies

Analysis of population evolution over time

Abstract

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal (IPD/CR) is an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with evolution that allows players to choose and to refuse their game partners. From individual behaviors, behavioral population structures emerge. In this report, we examine one particular IPD/CR environment and document the social network methods used to identify population behaviors found within this complex adaptive system. In contrast to the standard homogeneous population of nice cooperators, we have also found metastable populations of mixed strategies within this environment. In particular, the social networks of interesting populations and their evolution are examined.