“Although Her Words Said No, Her Actions Spoke Otherwise”: Potential Jurors’ Understanding of the “Reasonable Belief” Element of Sexual Assault Law

TL;DR

This study examines how potential jurors interpret the legal standard of 'reasonable belief' in sexual assault cases, revealing biases in how consent and non-consent are perceived.

Contribution

The study provides new insights into jurors' understanding of the 'reasonable belief' standard and its implications for sexual assault law.

Findings

Jurors perceive consent as implied and non-consent as explicit.

The reasonable belief standard may prioritize a defendant's interpretation over a complainant's refusal.

The standard fails to account for the defendant's honesty in interpreting consent.

Abstract

Sexual assault laws in several jurisdictions require jurors to consider whether a defendant “reasonably believed” in consent. Using thematic analysis, we explored how potential jurors (N = 50) make judgments about consent communication and the behaviors that, when informed by the reasonable belief standard, are perceived to communicate (non)consent. Two themes captured the perception that consent is something that is implied, while non-consent is explicit. This narrative supports legal scholars’ concerns that the reasonable belief standard is applied in inappropriate ways—prioritizing a defendant's sense of implied consent over a complainant's attempt to refuse and failing to consider the defendant's honesty.