# Mental Illness: A Deviation from Phenomenological, Rather than Moral, Norms?

## TL;DR

The paper argues that mental illness should be understood as a deviation from experiential well-being rather than a moral failing.

## Contribution

It introduces a novel 'phenomenological account' of mental illness that addresses moral concerns in psychiatric practice.

## Key findings

- The phenomenological account defines mental health through 'being-body' experiences linked to well-being.
- It frames mental illness as 'having-a-body' entrapment, which blocks flow experiences and well-being.
- The account is shown to better address moral objections than naturalism, constructivism, and hybridism.

## Abstract

Anti-psychiatrists contend that psychiatric practice is fundamentally misguided: it inappropriately medicalises difference by equating it with illness, resultantly forcing unwarranted “treatment” on the “mentally ill.” I explain why the most popular realist accounts of mental illness—naturalism, constructivism, and hybridism—are typically considered vulnerable to this moral problem. Then, I introduce “the phenomenological account” that promises to avoid it. The phenomenological account equates mental health with the being-body experiential mode, which is conducive to the flow experiences empirically demonstrated as constitutively necessary for subjective well-being. Mental illness, meanwhile, is equated with entrapment in the having-a-body mode. This precludes flow and, as such, subjective well-being. I explain why the phenomenological account is better placed to resolve the moral problem than its peers, thus providing a proof of principle demonstration of its potential to rebut the anti-psychiatry argument across the board. Finally, I defend the phenomenological account from three common objections.