The experimental psychology behind coordination

TL;DR

This paper explores the philosophical concept of coordination in science and its connection to construct validity in psychology, focusing on Reichenbach's early work in experimental psychology.

Contribution

The paper highlights Reichenbach’s early engagement with experimental psychology as a novel perspective on coordination and construct validity.

Findings

Reichenbach’s interpretation of coordination is shown to have roots in experimental psychology.

The historical context of Reichenbach’s work strengthens the link between coordination and construct validity.

The paper emphasizes the relevance of Reichenbach’s formulation in the philosophy of measurement.

Abstract

In the philosophy of science, the problem of coordination concerns the difficulty of linking abstract theoretical concepts with their empirical counterparts—that is, determining how theoretical terms such as “mass” or “temperature” correspond to observable phenomena. A closely analogous issue arises in psychology in relation to the concept of construct validity, which addresses the extent to which an empirical measure accurately represents the theoretical construct it is intended to assess. From the perspective of contemporary literature on coordination and validity, Reichenbach’s interpretation of coordination stands out as uniquely engaging, not only because it offers an account involving issues of particular significance within the philosophy of measurement, but also because it originated in a less limited conceptual landscape than it is generally assumed. In this paper, I will emphasize some historical aspects underlying Reichenbach’s formulation, particularly his early engagement with experimental psychology, which underpins and strengthens the potential of the connection between the concept of coordination and that of construct validity.