# Beyond the Lab: Cognitive Neuroscience in Real‐World Contexts

## TL;DR

This paper argues that cognitive neuroscience should move beyond lab-based assumptions to better reflect real-world behavior and environments.

## Contribution

The paper introduces a refined framework for ecological validity focusing on subject phenotype, task naturalness, and environmental fidelity.

## Key findings

- Common assumptions about lab animals and digital twins may limit understanding of real-world cognition.
- Natural settings offer behavioral flexibility and environmental variability that labs often exclude.
- Methodological shifts like mobile neuroimaging and immersive environments can enhance ecological validity.

## Abstract

Cognitive neuroscience has made remarkable advances by conducting rigorously controlled experiments inside the laboratory. However, the generalizability and real‐world relevance of these findings remain limited, in part due to fundamental, often unexamined, assumptions about how cognition operates across species and contexts. In this viewpoint, we critically evaluate three commonly held assumptions underlying current cognitive neuroscience practices: (1) laboratory animals serve as accurate representatives of their wild conspecifics; (2) animal models effectively mirror human cognitive processes; and (3) digital twins provide faithful, functionally equivalent representations of their real‐world analogs. We argue that these assumptions, if left unexamined, risk narrowing our understanding of cognition by excluding the behavioral flexibility, environmental variability, and agency that natural settings afford. We advocate for an expanded notion of ecological validity to include the naturalness of both subjects and environments, and we highlight methodological shifts, such as the use of enriched experimental contexts, mobile neuroimaging, and immersive virtual environments. By reassessing these foundational assumptions, we advocate for an approach to cognitive neuroscience that better reflects the complexity of real‐world behavior, species‐specific cognition, and the environments, physical or virtual, in which cognition is embedded.

Cognitive neuroscience often assumes that using laboratory animals, model species, and digital simulations enables generalizations from lab to wild, from animals to humans, and from virtual to physical. We challenge these assumptions and call for refining ecological validity along three dimensions: subject phenotype, task naturalness, and environmental fidelity.