# Do we have (in)compatibilist phenomenology of deliberation?: a survey

## TL;DR

This paper explores how the experience of making decisions relates to the philosophical debate about free will.

## Contribution

It introduces a systematic survey of compatibilist and incompatibilist views on deliberation's phenomenology and identifies methodological challenges.

## Key findings

- Compatibilist and incompatibilist interpretations of freedom in deliberation are contrasted.
- Psychological studies of folk experiences of deliberation are examined for relevance.
- Four methodological problems hinder the investigation of deliberation's phenomenology.

## Abstract

In this article, we survey contemporary works on the phenomenology of deliberation and discuss its relevance to the philosophical problems of free will. We first articulate the debate between compatibilist and incompatibilist interpretations of (leeway and source) freedom in the phenomenology of deliberation (Section 2). Next, we examine this issue in light of relevant psychological studies of the folk experiences of deliberation (Section 3), followed by a discussion of four general methodological problems in the investigation of the phenomenology of deliberation (Section 4): (i) the problem of heterogeneity, (ii) the problem of cognitive penetration, (iii) the problem of reliability, and (iv) the problem of relevance. We conclude that these problems suggest the need for the reconsideration of experimental methods and the role of the phenomenology of deliberation in the free will debate.