# Thinking of Oneself as Someone: The Structure of Self‐Representation

**Authors:** Julian Hauser

PMC · DOI: 10.1111/cogs.70186 · Cognitive Science · 2026-02-23

## TL;DR

This paper explores how self-representation works by examining how properties like time, body, and mind are represented in different ways.

## Contribution

It introduces the idea that egocentric and allocentric representations apply beyond spatial cognition to self-representation.

## Key findings

- Creatures can allocentrically represent temporal, bodily, and cognitive properties.
- Minimal self-representations differentiate the self from others and are linked to behavior and sensation.
- Integrated minimal self-representations are needed for more complex forms of self-representation in humans.

## Abstract

One question we can ask when investigating the nature of self‐representation concerns the types of property that must figure in its content. Here, authors have claimed that self‐representations must be about spatial, temporal, bodily, or mental properties. However, we can also ask a second question: how do we need to represent a property to self‐represent it? I address this latter question. I argue that a distinction between egocentric and allocentric forms of representation—known from spatial cognition—also applies to representations of other kinds of property. I use examples drawn from animal cognition and developmental psychology to show how creatures allocentrically represent their temporal, bodily, and cognitive properties. These representations are minimal self‐representations: they represent one's properties so that an explicit differentiation is made between the system and other objects (or between the system's actual and merely possible properties), they are directly linked to behavior and sensation, and they are immune to error through misidentification. The upshot is a view on which different creatures may self‐represent more or fewer kinds of property. More substantive forms of self‐representation (for instance, as exemplified by neurotypical adult human beings) then require integrated minimal self‐representations of the right kinds of property.

## Full-text entities

- **Diseases:** depersonalization disorder (MESH:D009358), IEM (MESH:D007154), headache (MESH:D006261)
- **Chemicals:** sugar (MESH:D000073893)
- **Species:** Bacillus sp. AT (species) [taxon 1196779], Rattus norvegicus (brown rat, species) [taxon 10116], Homo sapiens (human, species) [taxon 9606], Chiroptera (bats, order) [taxon 9397], Aphelocoma coerulescens (scrub jay, species) [taxon 39617]

## Full text

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## Figures

4 figures with captions in the complete paper: https://tomesphere.com/paper/PMC12930128/full.md

## References

109 references — full list in the complete paper: https://tomesphere.com/paper/PMC12930128/full.md

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Source: https://tomesphere.com/paper/PMC12930128