Inequality aversion and prosocial punishment: Evidence from a one-shot public goods game

TL;DR

This study explores why people punish free riders in public goods games and finds that inequality aversion may not be the main driver of such behavior.

Contribution

The study provides new experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality aversion and prosocial punishment in public goods games.

Findings

Inequality aversion does not predict prosocial punishment.

Punishment levels do not significantly differ across treatments.

Redistribution reduces punishment intensity toward richer individuals under high inequality.

Abstract

The willingness to engage in costly punishment of free riders (prosocial punishment) is crucial to foster group cooperation and understand public goods provision. While prosocial punishment is common across societies, its motivations remain unclear. Scholars have suggested that people resist inequitable outcomes and willingly bear costs to sanction free riders, seeking a fairer distribution of payoffs. This study tests a key implication of such fairness-driven arguments: if inequality aversion drives prosocial punishment, individuals should punish less when redistribution occurs, as equality concerns would be already satisfied. We conducted a pre-registered 2x2 between-subjects lab experiment (N=320), where participants completed a Social Value Orientation (SVO) task and played a one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG) with a Punishment Stage. We manipulated endowment inequality and the presence of redistributive taxation. Pre-registered analyses show that (1) inequality aversion does not predict prosocial punishment; (2) punishment levels do not significantly differ across treatments. However, exploratory results suggest that under high inequality, redistribution reduces the intensity of punishment towards richer individuals. This could indicate that inequality aversion triggers prosocial punishment only at acute inequality levels.

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