# Understanding Attorneys’ Plea Advice: The Role of Defendant Guilt and Trial Penalties

## TL;DR

This study explores how attorneys make plea recommendations based on defendant guilt and potential trial penalties, revealing patterns influenced by sentencing differentials.

## Contribution

The study empirically demonstrates how attorneys' plea advice aligns with Prospect Theory and is influenced by defendant guilt and trial penalties.

## Key findings

- Plea acceptance recommendations increased as potential trial sentences increased, within an acceptable range.
- Attorneys accepted longer plea sentences as trial penalties became more severe.
- Innocent defendants received shorter maximum plea sentences, especially with less severe trial sentences.

## Abstract

Plea bargaining underlies the majority of criminal convictions in the United States, yet concerns remain about its potentially coercive effects, particularly when sentencing differentials between plea offers and potential trial outcomes are large. This experiment examined practicing attorneys’ plea-related recommendations in a 2 (Defendant guilt status: guilty or innocent) × 3 (Potential trial sentence: low, moderate, or high) between-subjects design. Using an interactive computer simulation designed to convey legal scenarios engagingly, we measured attorneys’ plea recommendations, willingness to recommend the plea (WTRP), and maximum acceptable plea sentences. The results reflected Prospect Theory’s utility function, with plea acceptance recommendations increasing as potential trial sentences increased, provided the plea sentence remained within an acceptable range. Attorneys also accepted longer maximum plea sentences as trial penalties became more severe. An interaction between defendant guilt status and potential trial sentence showed that attorneys wanted shorter maximum plea sentences for innocent defendants, though this effect was moderated by trial sentence severity. These findings contribute to our understanding of how attorneys evaluate plea offers and illustrate how large sentencing differentials can shape their recommendations in ways that may affect the fairness of the plea-bargaining process.