# Is Wrenn’s Strong Virtue Theory of the value of truth too strong?

## TL;DR

The paper critiques Wrenn's argument that truth's value comes from the virtue of truthfulness rather than truth itself.

## Contribution

The author challenges the Strong Virtue Theory by proposing a thought experiment and discussing its compatibility with Aristotelianism.

## Key findings

- Wrenn's theory is argued to be either too strong or false.
- A thought experiment is introduced to support the idea that truth itself has value.
- Compatibility issues between Aristotelianism and the Strong Virtue Theory are highlighted.

## Abstract

In The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth (2023), Wrenn argues for a strong virtue theory of the value of truth. What makes truth valuable is Truthfulness, a human virtue. We value truth because we ought to be Truthful, and not vice versa (state-given). Therefore, he argues that the truth of a proposition as such does not confer value to states of believing it. I disagree. I argue that Wrenn’s Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth is either too strong or simply false. In any case, my main argument is based on a thought experiment that is supposed to challenge his theory, and pump our intuition that truth as such confers value on states of believing it (object-given). I also point to some issues that concern the compatibility of Aristotelianism and truth’s value, and also the formulation of the Strong Virtue Theory.

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s44204-025-00340-5.