# Deflationism, explanation and “because”

## TL;DR

This paper examines challenges to deflationism about truth and proposes a new approach called 'Aristotelian Deflationism' to address these issues.

## Contribution

The paper introduces 'Aristotelian Deflationism' as a novel approach to address objections against deflationism using 'because' principles.

## Key findings

- Responses to objections from Gamester and Heck highlight unresolved concerns for deflationists.
- Aristotelian Deflationism offers a compelling alternative to standard T-schema instances.
- The proposed view effectively addresses primary objections and residual concerns.

## Abstract

Two influential objections to deflationism about truth question its ability to explain the role of true beliefs in successful actions; and to account for general compositional principles linking truth to complex sentences governed by truth-functional connectives. In this paper, I address recent formulations of these objections by Will Gamester and Richard Heck. My responses draw on recent work on explanation, grounding, and the logic of “because”. However, each response leaves a residual concern for deflationists that these strategies alone cannot fully resolve. In the final section, I propose a view I call "Aristotelian Deflationism," which incorporates specific “because” principles relating to truth as an alternative to standard instances of the T-schema. While not deflationist in the strictest sense, I argue that this approach offers compelling ways to address both the primary objections and the residual concerns effectively.