# Is Radical Doubt Morally Wrong?

## TL;DR

This paper argues that extreme doubt in radical skepticism is not just an intellectual issue but also a moral failing that can harm others.

## Contribution

The paper introduces Moralism, a new perspective that frames radical skepticism as a moral and eudaimonic weakness.

## Key findings

- Radical skepticism is ethically defective because it prevents necessary doxastic commitments to others.
- Moralism offers two versions—encroachment and abrogation—to show how radical skepticism undermines belief stability.
- The paper suggests radical skepticism might also be politically problematic and risk injustice.

## Abstract

Is radical skepticism ethically problematic? This paper argues that it is. Radical skepticism’s strong regulation of our doxastic economy results in us having to forego doxastic commitments that we owe to others. Whatever skepticism’s epistemic defects, it is ethically defective. In turn, I defend Moralism, the view that the kind of extreme doubt characteristic of radical skepticism is a serious moral and eudaimonic weakness of radical skeptical epistemology. Whether this means that skepticism is false or incorrect, however, is a further claim that Moralists may or may not accept. I distinguish between an encroachment and abrogation version of the view, and show how each one bears on radical skepticism. In either case, Moralism makes our beliefs less vulnerable to radical revision. The paper concludes with some exploratory reflections on whether the argument can be extended to show that radical skepticism is politically problematic, even risking injustice.