Commitment & cooperation in social dilemmas with diverse individual preferences: An agent-based modeling approach
Zheng Jiang, Luzhan Yuan, Wei Wang, Gaowei Zhang, Yi Wang
TL;DR
This paper uses agent-based modeling to study how commitment affects cooperation in social dilemmas when individuals have different preferences.
Contribution
The study introduces individual differences in cooperation propensities into long-term social dynamics analysis using ABM.
Findings
Commitment can still promote cooperation with diverse preferences but has weaker effects.
The setup of commitment mechanisms significantly influences their effectiveness.
Integrating individual preferences improves understanding of collective cooperation dynamics.
Abstract
Social dilemmas often arise when the need for cooperation conflicts with individuals’ incentives to act in self-interest, potentially undermining collective well-being. Prior literature shows that some mechanisms, e.g., commitment, could give rise to cooperation. However, participants’ diverse propensities to cooperate may limit such mechanisms’ effectiveness. Thus, we bring individual differences in their propensities to cooperate into the reasoning of long-term social dynamics of cooperation through an agent-based modeling (ABM) approach. Our results suggest that commitment may still guarantee cooperation when individuals have different propensities to cooperate but have weaker effects, and the setups of commitment are also important. Our study highlights the importance of integrating individual preferences in analyzing collective dynamics of a population consisting of individuals of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence