# The Mind–Matter Dichotomy: A Persistent Challenge for Neuroscientific and Philosophical Theories

## TL;DR

This paper explores the unresolved challenge of understanding how the mind and matter relate, combining insights from neuroscience and philosophy.

## Contribution

It proposes a novel approach to the hard problem of consciousness by linking perception to cultural priors.

## Key findings

- Neurobiological studies and philosophical theories both struggle to bridge the gap between brain processes and consciousness.
- Perception is influenced by priors, some of which may originate from immaterial cultural concepts.
- The proposed approach does not fully resolve the cognitive dissonance between intuition and scientific evidence.

## Abstract

Several areas of cognitive neuroscience tackle traditional philosophical questions. Among the range of problems, two closely related issues will be addressed in more detail from both neurobiological and philosophical perspectives: the relationship between mind and matter and the nature of perception. Neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies are reviewed that examine the connection between neuronal processes and consciousness. The most prominent theories on the neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCC) are then compared with philosophical attempts to address the epistemic gap between the material processes in the brain and mental phenomena. Before exploring whether neurobiological discoveries can help resolve philosophical problems, the epistemic challenges are discussed, stemming from the fact that perceptions are shaped by the brain's functional architecture. It is suggested that the ‘hard problem of consciousness’—the challenge of explaining how the qualia of subjective experience can arise from neuronal processes—can be alleviated if two conditions are met: first, that perception depends on priors and, second, that some of these priors are formed through interactions with the immaterial realities of cultural concepts. Although this approach offers a coherent naturalistic explanation for the emergence of mental phenomena, it does not resolve the cognitive dissonance between our intuitions and scientific evidence regarding the relationship between matter and mind.