# A dualist theory of experience

## TL;DR

This paper proposes a new dualist theory of experience that explains how mental states can influence physical effects without violating physical laws.

## Contribution

The paper introduces delegatory dualism, a novel dualist framework that satisfies five stringent constraints for a coherent theory of experience.

## Key findings

- Delegatory dualism allows experiences to cause physical effects without violating causal closure.
- The theory avoids overdetermination and ensures functional duplication preserves phenomenology.
- It specifies psychophysical laws that link experiences to physical states.

## Abstract

Dualism holds that experiences somehow arise from physical states, despite being neither identical with nor grounded in such states. This paper motivates a stringent set of constraints on constructing a dualist theory of experience. To meet the constraints, a dualist theory must: (1) construe experiences as causes of physical effects, (2) ensure that experiences do not cause observable violations of the causal closure of the physical domain, (3) avoid overdetermination, (4) specify a set of psychophysical laws that yield experiences as a function of physical states, and (5) ensure that functional duplication preserves phenomenology. After motivating these constraints and explaining why existing dualist theories satisfy only some of them, I construct a dualist theory that satisfies all of them. On the resulting theory—which I call delegatory dualism—experiences uphold causal responsibilities “delegated” to them by physical states.