# How to Select the Leader in a One-Shot Public Goods Game: Evidence from the Laboratory

## TL;DR

This study explores how different ways of choosing a leader in a public goods game affect cooperation and contributions in a lab setting.

## Contribution

The paper introduces a new endogenous leadership selection mechanism that improves cooperation by reducing free-riding incentives.

## Key findings

- Introducing leadership does not inherently increase public goods contributions.
- Voluntary leadership performs poorly due to free-riding and uncooperative signals.
- Randomly selected voluntary leadership improves cooperation by signaling commitment.

## Abstract

We experimentally study how leadership selection mechanisms affect public goods provision. Introducing leadership does not raise contribution. Voluntary leadership performs the worst, primarily because the absence of leadership signals uncooperative play, and candidates free-ride on other leaders. Voluntary leadership from a randomly selected candidate is a promising endogenous leadership selection mechanism, primarily because assuming leadership by revealed preference signals cooperative play, the absence of leadership leaves the possibility of unlucky cooperative candidates, and sole leadership removes the leader’s free-riding incentives.