Between the Domestic and the Foreign: The KGB and Soviet Muslims in the Late USSR

TL;DR

This paper explores how the Soviet Union both relied on and distrusted its Muslim citizens for foreign policy and intelligence work in the late USSR.

Contribution

It reveals the contradictory Soviet approach toward Soviet Muslims, balancing their utility with deep suspicion.

Findings

Soviet Muslims were used as KGB operatives and diplomats in Muslim-majority regions.

The KGB often distrusted Soviet Muslims, keeping them in junior roles and monitoring their activities.

Some Soviet Muslims, especially in Azerbaijan, used Islam to oppose the Soviet state.

Abstract

This article examines the ambivalence of the Soviet authorities’ attitude to and policy toward Soviet Muslims in the 1970s and 1980s. Soviet Muslims were an asset for Soviet foreign policy in Muslim countries, serving as KGB operatives and as diplomats in the Middle East, Iran, South Asia, and Afghanistan and proved generally loyal to the Soviet state. However, some Soviet officials, notably in the KGB, did not fully trust Soviet Muslims. They kept them in junior positions abroad, suspected them of foreign sympathies, and continued to monitor their activities at home. This dichotomy was incarnated in Soviet Muslim border regions such as Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis were key to Soviet intelligence operations in Iran, but the KGB suspected them of sympathies for the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Some Soviet Muslims, including those in Azerbaijan, did root their opposition to the Soviet state in Islam.