‘I Condemn!’: A Discursive Analysis of Moral Condemnations in the Political Realm

TL;DR

The paper analyzes how moral condemnations in politics can be used to avoid taking action by shifting responsibility.

Contribution

It introduces a new perspective on moral condemnation as a tool for regulating action and displacing responsibility.

Findings

Moral condemnations can construct moral responsibility and guilt in political discourse.

They may serve as a substitute for action when actors are unwilling or unable to intervene.

Condemnations can create a socially acceptable excuse for inaction.

Abstract

In this paper, I present a crude, provisional theory of moral condemnation based on a discursive analysis of an interaction between two prominent political figures – on the social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter) – in the aftermath of the Iranian missile strike on Israel on 1 October 2024. Based on the analysis, I argue that moral condemnations may serve as a tool for regulating action, and I provide a game-based analogy which may help encapsule two central aspects of moral condemnation: the construction of moral responsibility and a relationship of guilt (setting the board); and the (attempt to) regulate action (playing the game). Finally, I propose that we may also use moral condemnations as a substitute for action – especially in instances where the actor is either unable or unwilling to intervene. By morally condemning we may create a socially and/or personally legitimate excuse for inaction through a displacement of the responsibility to act – thus, ultimately allowing oneself to not do anything by not doing nothing.

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